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Consent To Harm
Vera Bergelson*
The case of People v. Jovanovic, dubbed by tabloids the
"cybersex torture" case,1 began in November 1996, when Jamie
Ruzcek, a twenty-year-old Barnard student, reported to the po-
lice that she had been sexually assaulted by Oliver Jovanovic, a
thirty-year-old doctoral candidate at Columbia University. 2
The alleged assault happened during the first "live" date be-
tween Jovanovic and Ruzcek, which took place after weeks of
their on-line conversations and e-mail correspondence. 3 Accord-
ing to Ruzcek, "Jovanovic had hogtied her for nearly twenty
hours, violently raped and sodomized her, struck her repeatedly
with a club, severely burned her with candle wax, and repeat-
edly gagged her with a variety of materials."4
Jovanovoic was prosecuted, convicted of kidnapping, sexual
abuse, and assault, and sentenced to a term of 15 years to life. 5
He was released after twenty months in prison when the appel-
late court ruled that the trial judge improperly denied admis-
sion of portions of Ruzcek's e-mails to Jovanovic, in which she
discussed her sadomasochistic interests and experience. 6 The
* Professor of Law, Robert E. Knowlton Scholar, Rutgers School of Law-New-
ark; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., Institute of Slavic and Balkan Stud-
ies at the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union. This article will be published
in substantially the same form as a chapter in a multi-authored book, THE ETHICS
OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds.,
2009). This article is based, in part, and continues the discussion of problems re-
lated to consent to harm started in Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing
the Boundaries of Consent, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165 (2007). I am grateful to the
participants of the Victims and Criminal Justice System symposium at Pace Law
School for their thoughtful comments and to the deputy director of Rutgers Law
Library, Paul Axel-Lute, and my research assistant, Linda Posluszny, for their
massive help in researching this project.
1. Jovanovic v. City of New York, No. 04-8437, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59165,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2006).
2. Id. at *4.
3. People v. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159 (App. Div. 1999).
4. Jovanovic, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59165, at *4.
5. Id. at *9.
6. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
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court explained: "Because the jury could have inferred from the
redacted e-mail messages that the complainant had shown an
interest in participating in sadomasochism with Jovanovic, this
evidence is clearly central to the question of whether she con-
sented to the charged kidnapping and sexual abuse."7 Since
non-consent is an element of both offenses-kidnapping and
sexual abuse-the appellate court properly reversed Jovanovic's
convictions on both charges. But the court did not stop there; it
also reversed Jovanovic's conviction of assault in the second and
third degree.
Under New York law, a person is guilty of second-degree
assault when, "[w]ith intent to cause physical injury to another
person, he causes such injury to such person.., by means of a
deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument."8 A person is guilty
of third-degree assault when, "[w]ith intent to cause physical
injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person
. ... ,,9 Neither statutory provision lists the lack of consent as an
element to be proven by the prosecution or allows for the de-
fense of consent. And yet the appellate court did something
quite remarkable: it reversed the assault conviction and at the
same time (albeit in a footnote only) reiterated the traditional
rule that "[t]here is no available defense of consent on a charge
of assault . . . ."10 The court elaborated:
Indeed, while a meaningful distinction can be made between an
ordinary violent beating and violence in which both parties volun-
tarily participate for their own sexual gratification, nevertheless,
just as a person cannot consent to his or her own murder, as a
matter of public policy, a person cannot avoid criminal responsi-
bility for an assault that causes injury or carries a risk of serious
harm, even if the victim asked for or consented to the act. 1
In his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
Judge Mazzarelli pointed out the obvious discrepancy between
the majority's holding (consent is not a defense to assault) and
decision (reversal of the assault conviction). 12 He also opined
7. Id. at 168.
8. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(2) (McKinney 2006).
9. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00(1) (McKinney 2004).
10. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 169 n.5.
11. Id. (citations omitted).
12. Id. at 174 (Mazzarelli, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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that the evidence produced at the trial was sufficient to support
the defendant's conviction of assault,13 and the majority did not
dispute that conclusion.' 4 Technically, Judge Mazzarelli was
right, and the majority was wrong. The decision defied both for-
mal logic and the established rule, according to which consent
to assault, including private sadomasochistic activities, could
not exculpate the perpetrator. 15
However, from the perspective of fairness and internal con-
sistency of criminal sanctions, the Jovanovic appellate decision
was more justifiable than the current rule of law. Consider this:
assuming Jovanovic indeed caused Ruzcek a lot of pain and
anguish, why should her consent shield him from criminal lia-
bility for sexual violence and kidnapping, but not for assault?
Clearly, this is not because rape or kidnapping is a less serious
offense than assault. In fact, a person in danger of being raped
or kidnapped has the right to use any physical force, including
deadly force, to protect him or herself against that danger,
whereas a person in danger of a simple assault does not have
the same right. And yet consent of the victim "turns a rape into
love-making, a kidnapping into a Sunday drive, a battery into a
football tackle, a theft into a gift, and a trespass into a dinner
party,"116 but, except in a couple of narrowly defined circum-
13. Id. Judge Mazzarelli wrote:
[Tihe complaining witness's testimony was sufficient to support both of
these convictions, and, in the circumstances, hot candle wax was appropri-
ately considered a dangerous instrument. Moreover, the complainant's testi-
mony was corroborated by a neighbor who heard sounds as if someone were
"undergoing [a) root canal" from defendant's apartment at the time in ques-
tion, by the complaining witness's prompt outcries to five individuals, some
of these individuals' observations of the complaining witness's injuries, the
lab results as to her clothing, and the e-mails sent between the complaining
witness and defendant subsequent to the incident.
Id. at 175 (citations omitted).
14. See, e.g., id. at 198 n.5 (majority opinion) (accepting the jury finding that
the victim was physically injured during her encounter with the defendant).
15. See, e.g., People v. Samuels, 58 Cal. Rptr. 439, 513-14 (Ct. App. 1967);
State v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 303, 305-07 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); Commonwealth v.
Appleby, 402 N.E.2d 1051, 1059-61 (Mass. 1980); State v. Van, 688 N.W.2d 600,
613-15 (Neb. 2004); R v. Emmett, [1999] EWCA (Crim) 1710 (Eng.); R v. Brown,
[19921 2 All E.R. 552 (A.C.); R v. Donovan, (1934) 2 Eng. Rep. 498, 503 (K.B.).
16. Heidi M. Hurd, Blaming the Victim: A Response to the Proposal that Crim-
inal Law Recognize a General Defense of Contributory Responsibility, 8 BuFF.
CaIM. L. REV. 503, 504 (2005).
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stances, it is powerless to change the moral and legal character
of assault.
I. The Origins and Current Boundaries of the Rule
of Consent
Historically, the special rule of consent to physical harm
originated in Anglo-American jurisprudence in the 17th cen-
tury. Prior to that, an individual was free to consent practically
to anything, and consent was viewed as a complete ban on pros-
ecution. As the famous maxim goes, volenti non fit injuria: "a
person is not wronged by that to which he consents." 17 Changes
came as a result of the monopolization of the system of punish-
ment by the state. While in the early ages of criminal justice
the victim was the central figure in the prosecution and settle-
ment of any nonpublic offense,' 8 in the normative and central-
ized judicial structure the victim became almost entirely
excluded from the criminal process.' 9 "In contrast to the under-
standing of crime as a violation of the victim's interest, the
emergence of the state developed another interpretation: the
disturbance of the society."20 An increasing number of histori-
cally "private" offenses were reconceptualized as "public."'2' The
state (or king) became the ultimate victim and the sole prosecu-
tor of a criminal act.22 Consequently, an individual lost the
power to consent to what the state regarded as harm to itself.
17. See Terence Ingman, A History of the Defence of Volenti Non Fit Injuria,
26 JURID. REV. 1, 8-9 (1981).
18. See HARRY ELMER BARNES & NEGLEY K. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMI-
NOLOGY 342 (2d ed. 1951) (explaining that public offenses were those that exposed
a "group to spiritual or human enemies, particularly the former"). "Crimes against
persons were not controlled by the tribe or the family but by the clan under the
principle of blood feud." Id.
19. See Clarence Ray Jeffery, The Development of Crime in Early English So-
ciety, 47 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 647, 662 (1957) ("By 1226 an
agreement between the criminal and the relatives of a slain man would not avail to
save the murderer from an indictment and a sentence of death. The state no
longer allowed a private settlement of a criminal case.").
20. STEPHEN SCHAFER, VICTIMOLOGY: THE VICTIM AND HIS CRIMINAL 22 (1977).
21. By the eighteenth century, all crimes and misdemeanors were regarded as
public wrongs. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *5 ("[Public wrongs,
or crimes and misdemeanours, are a breach and violation of the public rights and
duties due to the whole community ... .
22. See id. at *5-6.
686 [Vol. 28:683
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In one of the earliest English cases that rejected consent of
the victim as a defense to serious bodily harm, the court opined
that the defendant was guilty because, by maiming the willing
victim, he deprived the king of the aid and assistance of one of
his subjects. 23 Three centuries later, an American court used a
very similar argument, explaining that the "commonwealth
needs the services of its citizens quite as much as the kings of
England needed the services of theirs."24
Today, American law continues to maintain that one's life
and body do not quite belong to him. Accordingly, an individual
has a very limited power to authorize an act that affects his
physical well-being. For example, the Model Penal Code
("MPC") views consent of the victim as a defense "if such con-
sent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the inflic-
tion of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense."25 This general rule, however, does not ap-
ply to offenses involving bodily harm. In those cases, consent of
the victim exonerates the perpetrator only in three sets of cir-
cumstances: (i) when the injury is not serious;26 (ii) when the
injury or its risk are "reasonably foreseeable hazards" of partici-
pation in a "lawful athletic contest or competitive sport or other
concerted activity not forbidden by law;"27 and (iii) when the
bodily harm was inflicted for the purpose of a "recognized form
of treatment" intended to improve the patient's physical or
mental health.28
This limited rule, which reflects the law in the absolute ma-
jority of states, 29 has been criticized for its narrow scope and
23. Id. at *205.
24. State v. Bass, 120 S.E.2d 580, 586 (N.C. 1961).
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(1) (1980).
26. Id. § 2.11(2)(a).
27. Id. § 2.11(2)(b).
28. Id. §§ 2.11(2)(c), 3.08(4)(a).
29. Thirteen states explicitly recognize a general defense of consent in their
statutes. See ALA.CODE § 13A-2-7 (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-505 (2004); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 451-453 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 702-233, 702-235 (1993)
(omits equivalent of subsection (2)(a)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 109 (2006)
(omits equivalent of subsection (3)(c)); VERNON'S ANN. Miss. STAT. §565.080; Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 565.080 (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-211 (2005); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 626:6 (1996) (omits equivalent of subsections (3)(c) and (3)(d)); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-10 (West 2005) (omits equivalent of subsection (3)(c)); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-08 (1997) (omits equivalent of subsection (3)(c)); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 311 (West 1998) (omits equivalent of subsection (2)(a)); TENN. CODE
2008] 687
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arbitrary boundaries. As one judge remarked, it is "very
strange that a fight in private between two youths where one
may, at most, get a bloody nose should be unlawful, whereas a
boxing match where one heavyweight fighter seeks to knock out
his opponent and possibly do him very serious damage should
be lawful."30 Examples of the law's arbitrariness are abundant.
Consider just a few.
A. Familial Breast Cancer Syndrome, Body Integrity Identity
Disorder, and Gender Identity Disorder
A woman who carries a breast cancer gene may choose to
have a preventive mastectomy. 31 Such radical surgery, al-
though quite lawful, is considered to be controversial in medical
literature: there is little proof that, for purposes of cancer pre-
vention, it is superior to less extreme and disfiguring alterna-
tives. 32 For women with "familial breast cancer syndrome," a
condition indicating a high risk for developing breast cancer, 33
the primary advantage of the surgery is that it helps to relieve
chronic stress and anxiety over the substantial likelihood of de-
veloping the disease.34
ANN. § 39-13-104 (2003) (omits equivalent of subsection (2)(c) and (3)); TEXAs PE-
NAL CODE ANN. § 22.06 (Vernon 2003) (omits equivalent of subsection (2)(c) and
(3)). Other states have incorporated the concept of consent in the Special Part of
their penal codes, making non-consent an element of an offense or providing for
the defense of consent with respect to specific crimes. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/12-17 (2002) ("It shall be a defense to any offense under Section 12-13
through 12-16 of this Code [sexual crimes] where force or threat of force is an ele-
ment of the offense that the victim consented."). Where the statute does not explic-
itly mention consent, case law usually defines in what circumstances consent may
function as a defense. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (WEST 1999) ("An assault
is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury
on the person of another."), with People v. Gordon, 11 P. 762, 762 (Cal. 1886) (stat-
ing that an attempt made with the victim's consent "will not constitute an
assault").
30. R. v. Brown, [1994] 1 A.C. 212, 278 (H.L.) (Lord Slynn's opinion).
31. See, e.g., Jane E. Brody, Personal Health, N.Y. TiMEs, May 5, 1993, at C13.
32. Lane D. Ziegler & Stephen S. Kroll, Primary Breast Cancer After Prophy-
lactic Mastectomy, 14 Am. J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 451, 453 (1991) (discussing con-
troversial nature of prophylactic mastectomy and comparing it with less radical
alternatives).
33. Id. at 452.
34. See Mal Bebbington Hatcher et al., The Psychosocial Impact of Bilateral
Prophylactic Mastectomy: Prospective Study Using Questionnaires and Semistruc-
tured Interviews, 322 BRIT. MED. J. 76 (2001).
688
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Yet, considerations of emotional pain fail to legitimize an
elective surgery on a patient with Body Integrity Identity Disor-
der ("BIID"), a rare ailment whose victims seek to become am-
putees.35 The limited statistics seem to indicate that, if BIID
patients succeed in their pursuit, their quality of life improves
dramatically.3 6 A surgeon who agrees to perform such an am-
putation, however, opens himself up to criminal liability be-
cause his patients' consent is legally invalid.37
The BIID patients often compare themselves to those suf-
fering from Gender Identity Disorders ("GID"), describing the
common experience as being "stuck in the wrong body. ''38 ' The
law, however, treats the two groups very differently: the GID
patients can consent to a sex change operation, which often in-
volves removal of healthy sex organs, 39 whereas the BIID suf-
ferers cannot consent to amputation of an arm or a leg.40
B. Sadomasochistic Beating, Religious Flagellation, and
Ritual Mutilation
According to the current rule of consent, a person may not
agree to physical injury. In practically every single case involv-
ing consensual sadomasochistic beating, the defendant was con-
victed of assault. In State v. Collier, for example, the court held
that the legislature did not intend to include sadomasochistic
35. Editorial, When It Feels Right to Cut Off Your Leg, GEELONG ADVERTISER
(Austl.), July 4, 2005, at 15.
36. Id.
37. But see Tim Bayne & Neil Levy, Amputees by Choice: Body Integrity Iden-
tity Disorder and the Ethics of Amputation, 22 J. APPLIED PHIL. 75, 84-85 (2005)
(arguing that, as long as people are legally sane, they should be allowed to have
their limbs amputated by a surgeon).
38. Carl Elliot, A New Way to Be Mad, ATLAwIc MONTHLY, Dec. 2000, at 73-
74.
39. See G.B. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555, 557 (Ct. App. 1978) (stating that
"[tihe severity of the problem of transsexualism becomes obvious when one con-
templates the reality of the male transsexual's desperate desire to have normally
functioning male genitals removed because the male sex organs are a source of
immense psychological distress").
40. See Annemarie Bridy, Confounding Extremities: Surgery at the Medico-
Ethical Limits of Self-Modification, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 148, 148, 151-55 (2004).
Bridy states that, "[tlo the extent that society and its institutions remain commit-
ted to a norm of bodily integrity that excludes the disabled body, it will remain
very difficult to collectively imagine that elective amputation could be good
medicine for apotemnophiles." Id. at 155.
20081 689
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encounters in the list of "'sport, social or other activity"' permit-
ted under the Iowa Code.41 Religious flagellation, on the other
hand, enjoys much more deferential treatment by authorities. 42
In a 19th century Scottish case, the court opined that "[i]n some
cases, a beating may be consented to as in the case of a father
confessor ordering flagellation; but this is not violence or as-
sault, because there is consent."43 More recently, some courts
have said that the law "may prohibit religiously impelled physi-
cal attacks,"44 but research has revealed no actual legal cases.
Some states even include the element of non-consent in the defi-
nition of ritual mutilation. The Illinois Criminal Code, for in-
stance, provides:
A person commits the offense of ritual mutilation, when he or she
mutilates, dismembers or tortures another person as part of a cer-
emony, rite, initiation, observance, performance or practice, and
the victim did not consent or under such circumstances that the
defendant knew or should have known that the victim was unable
to render effective consent.45
The italicized language indicates that if the religious muti-
lation, dismemberment, or torture is done with the consent of
the victim, such activity should be lawful.
C. Consensual Transmission of HIV
Even though consensual beating constitutes a crime, con-
sensual intentional transmission of HIV is most likely not pun-
ishable in a significant number of states. The phenomenon,
known as "bug-chasing," involves "bug-chasers" (HIV-negative
men who actively seek out infection by having unprotected sex
with infected partners) and "gift-givers" (HIV-positive men will-
ing to infect "bug-chasers"). According to a source, this practice
is the cause of 25 percent of all new infections among American
41. See State v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (quoting
IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.1 (West 2003)).
42. Law Commission, Consultation Paper 139, Consent in the Criminal Law
10.1-10.4 (1995).
43. Id. (citation omitted).
44. United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1496 (D. Wyo. 1995). See
Ogletree v. State, 440 S.E.2d 732, 733 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (opining that, even had
the victim consented, the severe beating ordered by a pastor would still constitute
battery).
45. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-32(a) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
690 [Vol. 28:683
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gay men.46 These statistics have been questioned, but even if
they are not entirely accurate, there is a general consensus that
"bug-chasing" and "gift-giving" present a serious problem for
the gay community.47 Nevertheless, out of twenty-four states
that have statutes criminalizing the act of knowingly exposing
another human being to HIV, eight states explicitly recognize
consent of the victim as an affirmative defense, 48 and another
ten reach the same outcome by making failure to disclose one's
HIV status an element of the crime. 49
Since any harmful act that does not fit into the "athletic" or
"medical" exception is, by definition, criminal, unless the in-
flicted injury is not serious, assessment of the seriousness of the
victim's injury determines the outcome of many cases involving
consensual harm. A typical penal statute classifies bodily in-
jury as serious if it "creates a substantial risk of death or...
causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ."50
Pursuant to this definition, any short-term, non-life-threaten-
ing injury should not be deemed "serious." Yet, as the MPC ac-
knowledges, the assessment of the seriousness of harm is often
affected by judges' "moral judgments about the iniquity of the
conduct involved."51 Courts tend to inflate the risk and
harmfulness of an activity they want to denounce. For example,
any injury caused during a sadomasochistic encounter has been
consistently classified as serious.
46. Gregory A. Freeman, Bug Chasers: The Men Who Long to Be HIV+, ROLL-
ING STONE, Jan. 23, 2003, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/
5939950/bug-chasers.
47. Amanda Weiss, Comment, Criminalizing Consensual Transmission of
HIV, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 389, 389-90 (2006).
48. Those states are: Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Nevada, North Dakota,
South Dakota, and Tennessee. Leslie E. Wolf & Richard Vezina, Crime and Pun-
ishment: Is There a Role for Criminal Law in HIV Prevention Policy?, 25 WHITTIER
L. REV. 821, 854 (2004).
49. Those states are: Arkansas, California, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan,
Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Carolina. Id.
50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(3) (1980). Following the Model Penal Code,
many states have adopted an identical or similar definition. See, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:11-1(b) (West 2005); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(46) (Vernon 2005).
51. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11 cmt. 2 n.8 (1980). The Commentary points out
that the MPC provision does not explicitly foreclose resort to such judgments,
though the envisioned emphasis is on the amount of injury itself. Id.
2008]
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In State v. Collier, the victim's injuries consisted of "a swol-
len lip, large welts on her ankles, wrists, hips, buttocks, and
severe bruises on her thighs."5 2 The defendant was convicted of
assault resulting in a serious injury, and the appellate court
agreed, although, as the dissenting judge pointed out, the in-
flicted bodily harm did not constitute a serious injury within the
meaning of the state statute.53
Some state penal codes include physical pain in the defini-
tion of "bodily harm. '54 In State v. Guinn, the defendant was
convicted of inflicting "serious physical injury" in the course of a
sexual encounter.55 There was no evidence that the victim
"'ever required any medical attention or suffered any wounds of
any sort."'56 Yet the appellate court sustained the assault con-
viction, reasoning that the sadomasochistic paraphernalia used
by the defendant must have caused serious physical pain (can-
dle wax was "'hot and it stung"' and nipple clamps were "'tight
and cutting"'), 57 and "physical pain" satisfied the definition of
"physical injury."58 Naturally, under a statute of this type,
practically any sadomasochistic activity may be characterized
as criminal.
52. State v. Collier, 372 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985). See R v. Dono-
van, (1934) 2 Eng. Rep. 498, 502-03 (K.B.) ("seven or eight red marks" on the body
of a participant of a sadomasochistic encounter found to be sufficient for an assault
conviction); R v. Emmett, [1999] EWCA (Crim) 1710 (Eng.) (bloodshot eyes and a
burn, which had completely healed by the time of the trial, sufficed for an assault
conviction of a participant of consensual sadomasochistic sex).
53. Collier, 372 N.W.2d at 309 (Schlegel, J., dissenting).
54. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.04.110(4)(a) (2004) ("'Bodily injury,' 'phys-
ical injury,' or 'bodily harm' means physical pain or injury, illness, or an impair-
ment of physical condition."); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(2) (1980). In State v.
Guinn, the relevant statute did not define "serious physical injury." State v.
Guinn, No. 23886-1-I, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 502, at *33 (Ct. App. March 30,
2001). But "'substantial bodily harm"' was defined as "'bodily injury which in-
volves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary
but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ, or
which causes a fracture of any bodily part.'" Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.04.110(4)(b) (2004)). And "'great bodily harm'" was defined as "'bodily injury
which creates a probability of death, or which causes significant serious perma-
nent disfigurement, or which causes a significant permanent loss or impairment of
the function of any bodily part or organ.'" Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.04.110(4)(c) (2004)).
55. Guinn, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 502, at *32.
56. Id. at *34.
57. Id.
58. Id.
692
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The current rule of consent to harm is problematic on many
levels: not only is it arbitrary and strict; it is also autocratic and
absolute. People are allowed to consent to harm only if their
activities are on the list of things approved by the state. The
law envisions no balancing or accommodation of conflicting in-
terests of an individual and society. The disregard for an indi-
vidual, inherent in this rule, goes against the basic principles of
autonomy and personal responsibility defining American crimi-
nal law. Moreover, the authoritarian presumption that it is not
an individual, but rather the state that is the victim of every
crime is plainly wrong because, if that were so, then consent
would not be a defense to any harm.59 Yet we know that indi-
viduals are free to consent to all kinds of harm-emotional, fi-
nancial, reputational-as long as these harms are not physical.
This critique prompts two questions: one, why do we per-
ceive consent to bodily harm so differently than consent to any
other activity, specifically, why does consent preclude such of-
fenses as theft, rape, or kidnapping but not murder or battery;
and two, if we were to revise the current law of consent, where
should we draw the line between permissible and impermissible
bodily harm?
II. Why Consent to Physical Harm is Treated Differently
Than Any Other Waiver of Rights
To have a right means to have a certain moral status. Con-
sent is a way to change this status unilaterally by transferring
to another person a claim, privilege, power, or immunity.60 For
example, by promising a neighbor that I will sell him my car, I
give him a claim against me with regard to that promise. By
consenting to a root canal procedure, I give my dentist a privi-
lege to perform it. By inviting a friend to dinner, I give him a
power to visit me. In all those instances, I waive a right I used
to have and give other people rights they did not have before.
And yet there is an important difference in how consent
59. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and
Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 570 (2004) (pointing out that "if the state were
indeed the victim of every crime, then consent should be a defense to none").
60. See generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEP-
TIONS (1923). See also JUDITH JARvis THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 360-61
(1990).
2008] 693
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changes the relevant relationship between the parties in some
of these scenarios.
Recall the MPC consent provisions. Under the MPC, volun-
tary consent of a legally competent individual may trigger two
different rules, either the general rule or the specific rule for
consent to bodily harm. We already reviewed the latter; now
let's have a closer look at the former. The MPC general rule of
consent provides that consent of the victim is a defense if it ei-
ther "negatives an element of the offense or precludes the inflic-
tion of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense."61 What is peculiar in this rule is that both
grounds for the defense have little to do with the theory of
defenses.
Any defense presumes that a criminal act has been commit-
ted; however, it was committed under the circumstances that
may either justify or excuse the perpetrator. An act is criminal
only if it encompasses all elements of the offense. If an element
is missing, no defense is needed simply because the perpetrator
is not guilty even of a prima facie criminal wrongdoing. 62 For
example, each of the offenses of rape, kidnapping, and theft in-
cludes in its definition the element of non-consent. 63 If that ele-
ment is negated by the victim's acquiescence, the defendant is
completely exonerated by the so-called failure of proof. In these
circumstances, consent of the victim does not serve as a defense;
instead, it defeats the very possibility of an offense.
The second, alternative ground for the MPC defense of con-
sent is also puzzling: on the one hand, it almost verbatim re-
peats a segment of Section 3.02, which summarizes generic
requirements for a defense of justification; on the other hand it
differs from Section 3.02 in a meaningful way. Section 3.02
maintains that conduct is justifiable if "the harm or evil sought
to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense charged."64 The itali-
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(1) (1980) (emphasis added).
62. "Justification and excuses do not seek to refute any required element of
the prosecution's case; rather they suggest further considerations that negate cul-
pability even when all elements of the offense are clearly present." SANFORD H.
KADISH, STEPHEN J. SHULHOFER & CAROLE S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 737 (8th ed. 2007).
63. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 212.1, 213.1, 223.2 (1980).
64. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a) (1980) (emphasis added).
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cized words coincide with the language of Section 2.11. How-
ever, if the general justification provision requires only that the
inflicted harm or evil be lesser than the harm or evil that was
avoided, the consent provision talks about complete preclusion
of any harm or evil that is sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense. The consent provision, thus, exculpates
the defendant only when social harm is entirely avoided. But if
there is no social harm, why should the defendant even need a
defense? Isn't this provision merely a broader version of the
first part of the section (i.e. negation of an element of the of-
fense charged)?
The materials of the American Law Institute ("ALI") pro-
ceedings confirm this supposition. According to MPC Reporter
Herbert Wechsler, the alternative ground for relief in Section
2.11(1) was intended to cover a situation when the definition of
an offense, which logically should have incorporated the non-
consent language, by legislative oversight or for some other rea-
son, is omitted.
There are also cases where in the definition of a crime the
words "without consent" have not been put in, but where it is
perfectly clear that in the legislative conception of the offense
the idea was intended, and that is the purpose for the rest of
part (1); that if consent precludes the infliction of the harm or
evil sought to be prevented by the legislature, then even though
it does not negative the formal element, it still ought to be a
defense. 65
In other words, the defense of consent set forth in Section
2.11(1) of the MPC is not a defense at all. Instead it is another
way to state the rule that a person is not guilty of an offense
unless each element of the offense is proven beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.6 6 In that sense, Section 2.11(1) is redundant, and the
drafters of the MPC have acknowledged that by calling it
65. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
39TH ANNUAL MEETING, 90-91 (1962). A typical case envisioned by the drafters of
the MPC would involve damage of property with the owner's consent. Id. at 91
("Obviously the whole idea of the crime is misusing somebody else's property.").
66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1) (1980) ("No person may be convicted of an
offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is assumed.").
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"merely tautological"67 and contrasting it with the specific rule
of consent to bodily harm stated in Section 2.11(2):
Now, the second part is more than tautological. There is a real
need to indicate when and how far consent should be a defense to
bodily injury crimes, because again you wouldn't draft a murder
statute in terms of killing somebody without his consent. Obvi-
ously, the idea is that it's a crime whether he consents or not, and
how far consent to bodily injury should go involves some deep
questions of policy.68
The conceptual imprecision of Section 2.11 would be of little
interest today had it not reflected an important intuition of the
MPC drafters apparent in their attempt to differentiate be-
tween two entirely different roles of consent in criminal law.
Compare cases of rape, kidnapping, or theft on the one hand,
and cases of killing or maiming on the other. In the first group
of cases, the act itself does not violate a prohibitory norm. Hav-
ing sex, transporting someone to a different location, or taking
other people's property is not bad in itself. It becomes bad only
due to the absence of consent. In other words, no matter how
we draft the statute, in cases of theft, rape, or kidnapping the
role of consent is inculpatory-non-consent is a part of the defi-
nition of the offense.69
In contrast, causing pain, injury, or death is not morally
neutral; it is regrettable.70 Bringing about a regrettable state of
events is bad and should be avoided. 71 Therefore, the law
should promote a conduct rule that prohibits the very act of kill-
ing or hurting, providing, of course, for the necessary excep-
tions, such as self-defense. However, the fact that a person may
be legally justified in killing an aggressor does not make the
killing as morally neutral as borrowing a book-it is still regret-
67. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 65, at 90.
68. Id. at 91.
69. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 705 (1978); Vera
Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 165, 202-03 (2007).
70. See, e.g., R v. Brown, [1994] 1 A.C. 212, 250 (H.L.) (Lord Lowry's opinion)
(opining that "for one person to inflict any injury on another without good reason is
an evil in itself (malum in se) and contrary to public policy").
71. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw: HARM-
LESS WRONGDOING 18 (1988) (defining evil in the most generic sense as "any occur-
rence or state of affairs that is rather seriously to be regretted").
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table. It is still regrettable that a dental patient has to suffer
pain, even though the dentist is justified in causing it, 72
whereas there is nothing regrettable in consensual sex or con-
sensual change of ownership. To lose or reduce its inherent
wrongfulness, the act of killing or hurting requires justification.
The role of consent here is exculpatory; it may only serve as a
defense.
To distinguish a definition from a defense, we need to iden-
tify a prohibitory norm, which "must contain a sufficient num-
ber of elements to state a coherent moral imperative." 73 In the
case of killing or inflicting pain, this imperative is quite
straightforward: do not kill, do not inflict pain. But what con-
duct rule do we want to convey to the community in cases of
rape, theft, or criminal mischief? Should it say: Do not have
sex? Do not take other people's possessions? Do not break
other people's property? Certainly not. Even the last rule, the
most controversial of the three, would be unmerited and im-
practicable. There is nothing wrong with breaking things. Peo-
ple may need to break things, including those belonging to
others, in the process of construction, repair, cleaning, cooking,
or just having fun. We do not want to prohibit useful or morally
neutral activities. What we want to prohibit is engaging in
these activities under the circumstances that make such activi-
ties wrongful. Accordingly, the conduct rule applicable to kill-
ing or hurting does not require the non-consent language,
whereas the conduct rule prohibiting rape, theft, or criminal
mischief simply makes no sense without the non-consent
element.
In practical terms, this distinction means that consent pre-
cludes even a prima facie case of rape, theft, or criminal mis-
chief, regardless of whether the consensual act brings about
more good than harm, and regardless of whether the defendant
is aware of the victim's consent. Significantly more is required
72. See, e.g., Peter Westen's persuasive argument that consent to injury does
not eliminate its harmfulness. PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVER-
sITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 115
(2004) (stating that it would be "patently false to say that a person who consents to
conduct, e.g., a medical patient who consents to surgical amputation of an eye or
limb or a breast, suffers no burdens or setbacks to her interests of any kind from
it").
73. FLETCHER, supra note 69, at 568.
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to establish a successful defense, and a failure to satisfy the re-
quirements is significantly more costly. For example, under the
current law, as Paul Robinson correctly pointed out, the defen-
dant's lack of knowledge of a legally relevant fact has different
consequences in cases of "impossible" attempts on the one hand
and cases of "unknowingly justified" actors on the other.7 4 In
cases of the first kind, the most serious offense of which the de-
fendant may be convicted is attempt (e.g., a perpetrator who
proceeds with intercourse while-mistakenly-believing his
partner to be a minor is guilty of attempted statutory rape),
whereas in cases of the second kind, the defendant is guilty of a
completed offense (e.g., a perpetrator who shoots his enemy to
death is guilty of murder even if, unbeknownst to the perpetra-
tor, the enemy was about to attack him with a deadly weapon).
Since in most jurisdictions a completed offense is punished
more severely than an attempt,75 the perpetrator who was una-
ware of a "lucky" fact that negated an element of an offense is
treated better than the perpetrator who was unaware of a
"lucky" justifying fact.
Why is that so? Mainly because we view a defense of justi-
fication as a limited license to commit an otherwise prohibited
act in order to achieve a socially and morally desirable out-
come.76 For instance, if a group of mountaineers, caught by a
snowstorm, took refuge in a deserted cabin and consumed the
owner's provisions, they would be justified under the defense of
necessity. 77 This limited license is teleological in nature; it
presumes an objective need, an objectively preferable outcome,
and the good faith of the actors. If, say, the mountaineers com-
74. See Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories of Justification: Deeds v. Rea-
sons, in: HARM AND CULPABILITY 45 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996).
75. See KADiSH, SHULHOFER & STEIKER, supra note 62, at 544-45. Note, how-
ever, that the MPC and a substantial minority of states that follow the MPC im-
pose the same punishment for an attempt as for the crime attempted (except for
the crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment). See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §53a-51 (West 2008); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 905 (West 2007); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 5.05(1) (1980). In these states, the defendants guilty of an "impossible"
attempt and the "unknowingly justified" defendants would be, in most instances,
treated identically.
76. Fletcher, supra note 69, at 565 (arguing that justification is an exception
to a prohibitory norm and, as such, should be available only to those who merit
special treatment).
77. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 1 (1980).
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mitted the break-in because, in their minds, it was a lesser evil
than remaining hungry for the next few hours, they would not
be entitled to the defense. 78 Nor would they be justified if the
reason for breaking in was a desire to have an impromptu party
in the cabin. The mountaineers would not be justified even if,
unknowingly, they in fact saved their lives by hiding from the
upcoming snowstorm. 79
Thus, in order to be justified, the mountaineers must estab-
lish three elements:
(i) the basis for the defense (actual necessity);
(ii) an objectively preferable outcome (a positive balance of
harms and evils); and
(iii) the subjective belief in the necessity of overstepping a
prohibitory norm in order to achieve this preferable outcome.80
Similarly, to be justified for hurting someone in self-defense
or defense of another, the defendant must establish:
(i) the basis for the defense (immediate necessity to fend off
an unlawful attack);8'
(ii) an objectively preferable outcome (it is preferable to
harm an aggressor rather than allow the aggressor to harm an
innocent victim); and
(iii) the subjective belief in the necessity of overstepping a
prohibitory norm in order to achieve this preferable outcome.
If the perpetrator used force in the absence of necessity (no
basis for defense) or injured several innocent bystanders in or-
der to immobilize the aggressor (not an objectively preferable
outcome), he would not be justified (although he may be ex-
78. See id. § 3.02 cmt. 2 (pointing out that "one who takes a life in order to
avoid financial ruin does not act from a justifying necessity").
79. But see Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a
Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 288-91 (1975) (arguing
that claims of justification should prevail regardless of the actor's state of mind).
80. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 2 (1980) ("It is not enough that the
actor believes that his behavior possibly may be conducive to ameliorating certain
evils; he must believe it is 'necessary' to avoid the evils.").
. 81. The MPC is different: its self-defense provision is entirely subjective. As
long as the actor believes his use of force to be necessary to fend off an unlawful
attack, he is justified. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04. The actor may still be re-
sponsible for reckless (or negligent) homicide or injury if his beliefs were held reck-
lessly (or negligently).
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cused). Nor would he be justified if he merely used the attack
as a ploy to harm the aggressor (bad faith).
The last point may be illustrated by the following example:
suppose person A hates his enemy B and wants him dead.
Knowing that B frequents a certain bar, A spends night after
night outside the bar waiting for an occasion. While he is wait-
ing, he witnesses numerous fights, sexual assaults, even
murders; however, he never interferes, until finally one day he
sees B attacking another patron C with deadly force. Knowing
the law of defense of another,8 2 A intervenes and kills B. At his
trial, A honestly tells his story of patience and determination.
Should he be rewarded for these qualities and completely exon-
erated, even though we know that he would not have defended
C but for his desire to kill B?
Although technically A is entitled to an acquittal, I think
most of us would view such an outcome as a mockery of justice.
Justification defenses are not intended to provide people with
convenient opportunities to commit crimes. Any justifiable con-
duct requires good faith; and, in the context of a limited license
to overstep a prohibitory norm, the requirement of good faith
should be satisfied only when the subjective purpose of the per-
petrator is directed towards the goals for which that license is
granted.
Furthermore, under the MPC, the "choice of evils" is not
available as a defense against a reckless (or negligent) crime if
the defendant was reckless (or negligent) in bringing about the
situation that made the injurious choice necessary.8 3 Similarly,
the MPC and the law of most states deny the perpetrator the
justifications of self-defense and defense of another in prosecu-
tion for a reckless (or negligent) crime, if the belief that would
otherwise justify his actions was held recklessly (or negli-
gently).84 Under this logic, should not a defendant who inten-
tionally placed himself in a situation in which he would be able
to use the defense of another as a cover up for intentional homi-
cide be denied the defense of justification? The language of the
82. See, e.g., id. § 3.05.
83. Id. § 3.02(2). In a number of states, the rule is even stricter: the defense of
necessity is completely foreclosed for an actor who was at fault in bringing about
the situation requiring the choice of harms or evils. See id. § 3.02 cmt. 5 n.27.
84. Id. § 3.09.
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MPC certainly suggests this conclusion: in determining the per-
petrator's eligibility for self-defense and related defenses, the
MPC addresses only the actor who "believes that the use of force
upon or toward the person of another is necessary for any of the
purposes for which such belief would establish a justification."8 5
Applying the same logic to the defense of consent, we,
therefore, should only grant complete justification to the perpe-
trator who can establish all requirements of the justificatory de-
fense, namely:
(i) the basis for the defense (valid consent of the victim);
(ii) an objectively preferable outcome (a positive balance of
harms and evils); and
(iii) the subjective belief in the necessity of hurting the vic-
tim in order to achieve this preferable outcome.
In what follows I consider these requirements and their ap-
plication in more detail.
III. The Defense of Consent
The requirement of valid consent is quite straightforward,
at least in theory.8 6 To be valid, consent must be rational and
voluntary, that is, freely given and informed.8 7 Consent ob-
tained by duress or fraud regarding the nature of the perpetra-
tor's act is void ab initio.88 Certain groups of people (e.g.,
children, mentally ill, intoxicated), in most instances, are
deemed incapable of granting valid consent.8 9 In addition, there
is a strong argument that courts should require higher levels of
rationality and voluntariness of the victim's decision as the
amount of inflicted or risked harm increases.90 For example,
85. Id. § 3.09(2) (emphasis added).
86. For an excellent discussion of confusion between actual and legally valid
consent, see WESTEN, supra note 72, at 119-24.
87. See, e.g., 3 JOEL FE1NBERG, THE MORAL LIMITs OF CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO
SELF 316 (1986) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF].
88. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(d)(3), § 2.11 cmt. 3 (1980).
89. See FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 87, at 316. Feinberg wrote:
If he is so impaired or undeveloped cognitively that he doesn't really know
what he is doing, or so impaired or undeveloped volitionally that he cannot
help what he is doing, then no matter what expression of assent he may
appear to give, it will lack the effect of genuine consent.
90. Id. at 117-21.
20081
19
PACE LAW REVIEW
simple "sure, why not?" may be sufficient to constitute consent
for piercing-but not cutting off-one's ears.91
One could argue that, when the perpetrator, acting in good
faith, produces a measurably positive outcome, consent of the
victim does not matter. And indeed, sometimes the law justifies
a benevolent action even though it overrides another person's
autonomy. For example, it is permissible to use force against a
person in order to stop his suicidal attempt. At least in part,
this rule reflects societal perception of suicide as inherently ir-
rational. Whether this perception is accurate and the rule is
morally sustainable is a question open for debate. It is clear,
however, that the application of the rule is quite limited. It is
impermissible to force-feed a competent, free individual who
wishes to starve himself to death. It is impermissible to per-
form a surgery on an unwilling patient, even if that surgery is
beneficial for the patient's health. And, it is certainly imper-
missible to perform involuntary euthanasia on any conscious
human being under any circumstances.
Consider Gilbert v. State, in which the court convicted a
seventy-five-year-old man of first-degree murder for shooting
his wife to death.92 Roswell and Emily Gilbert had been mar-
ried for fifty-one years. 93 For the last few years of her life, Em-
ily suffered from osteoporosis and Alzheimer's disease, and her
condition rapidly deteriorated. 94 Testifying at his trial, Roswell
Gilbert said: "'there she was in pain and all this confusion and I
guess if I got cold as icewater that's what had happened. I
thought to myself, I've got to do it ... I've got to end her suffer-
ing . . . ."'95 As dramatic and sad as this case is, the appellate
court was right to affirm the defendant's conviction. Roswell
Gilbert was motivated by compassion and desire to protect his
91. Id. at 124-27. Feinberg wrote:
In the cases of 'presumably nonvoluntary behavior,' what we 'presume' is
either that the actor is ignorant or mistaken about what he is doing, or act-
ing under some sort of compulsion, or suffering from some sort of incapacity,
and that if that were not the case, he would choose not to do what he seems
bent on doing now.
Id. at 124.
92. Gilbert v. State, 487 So. 2d 1185, 1186-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
93. Id. at 1187.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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wife from suffering and, in fact, he did everything in his power
to make her death as painless as possible.96 But even if her con-
dition was so desperate that Roswell objectively benefited Emily
by cutting short her agony, he should not be entitled to justifica-
tion. Unauthorized homicide of an autonomous human being is,
and should be, murder. No one has the right to decide for an-
other person that his life is not worth living, or, citing the words
of the Gilbert opinion, "'[giood faith' is not a legal defense to
[first-degree] murder."97
The requirement to achieve a positive balance of harms and
evils raises a more complicated question of law and policy. Tra-
ditionally, criminal harm is understood as wrongful interfer-
ence with the victim's essential welfare interests. 98 The
interference is deemed wrongful if it violates the victim's rights.
From this perspective, consensual physical harm presents a
problem: since consent constitutes a waiver of rights, the perpe-
trator who kills or injures a willing victim does not violate the
victim's rights. But can we say that cases of voluntary euthana-
sia, consensual cannibalistic killing, and sadomasochistic beat-
ing are equally free from criminal wrongdoing?
In an attempt to resolve this problem, a number of scholars
have recently suggested that the concept of criminal harm
should not be limited to a violation of one's autonomy.9 9 In their
view, such acts as, say, consensual gladiatorial matches are im-
permissible because they violate the participants' dignity, and
dignity is so essential to our humanity that, in cases of a conflict
between autonomy and dignity, the former ought to yield. 100
96. Id. at 1188 (acknowledging the defendant's explanation that he used a gun
because it causes instantaneous death).
97. Id. at 1191.
98. JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 62
(1984). Those include "interests in the continuance for a foreseeable interval of
one's life, and the interests in one's own physical health and vigor, the integrity
and normal functioning of one's body, the absence of absorbing pain and suffering
or grotesque disfigurement, minimal intellectual acuity, emotional stability ......
Id. at 37.
99. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Basic Values and the Victim's State of Mind, 88
CAL. L. REV. 759, 769-70 (2000); Dubber, supra note 59, at 568; R.A. Duff, Harms
and Wrongs, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 13, 39-44 (2001); R. George Wright, Consenting
Adults: The Problem of Enhancing Human Dignity Non-Coercively, 75 B.U. L. REV.
1397, 1399 (1995).
100. Wright, supra note 99, at 1399; see also Dan-Cohen, supra note 99, at
777-78; Dubber, supra note 59, at 568 (arguing that personal autonomy includes
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For that reason, consent may not serve as a defense to the viola-
tion of dignity.
I share the view that certain degrading behavior may be
wrongful even when it does not violate the victim's rights. Soci-
ety may be concerned about human dignity in various circum-
stances, including those in which a prohibitory norm does not
originate in a rights violation. Consider experiments conducted
in the 1980s that involved the use of fresh cadavers as "crash
dummies." 10 When those experiments became known, they
caused public outrage. 102 But why? We usually do not feel of-
fended by autopsies or postmortem organ donation. Perhaps, as
Joel Feinberg has suggested, the answer has something to do
with the perceived symbolism of the different uses: "In the air
bag experiments cadavers were violently smashed to bits,
whereas dissections are done in laboratories by white-robed
medical technicians in spotless antiseptic rooms, radiating the
newly acquired symbolic respectability of professional
medicine." 0 3
Or perhaps the difference is not merely symbolic, and vio-
lently smashing cadavers to bits is, in fact, disrespectful-disre-
spectful of our only recently shared humanity? An act of
autopsy or removal of an organ for transplantation is not quali-
tatively different from a regular surgery. Extracting a kidney,
inter vivo or postmortem, does not reduce one's moral status to
that of a thing. Smashing a body in an industrial experiment or
using human remains to manufacture soap does have this ef-
fect. In other words, even when an act of indignity is committed
on an unconscious or dead body or when the victim does not
perceive an assault on his dignity as such, a wrongful act has
been done.
What is at stake here is people's moral dignity, or dignity of
personhood, as opposed to social dignity, or dignity of rank. So-
cial dignity is nonessential; in a society that permits social mo-
bility, it can be gained and lost. 64 "Moral dignity, by contrast,
dignity, and that the concept of criminal harm should be based on protection of a
person rather than a state).
101. Joel Feinberg, The Mistreatment of Dead Bodies, 15 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 31, 31-32 (1985).
102. Id. at 31.
103. Id.
104. Dubber, supra note 59, at 535.
704 [Vol. 28:683
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss4/3
CONSENT TO HARM
is an essential characteristic of all" human beings. 10 5 It is so
important for our collective humanity that we extend it not only
to those "who satisfy the minimum requirements of per-
sonhood,"10 6 but even to those who closely miss them.
And yet, as important as moral dignity is, its violation
should not be criminalized lightly. Whenever the state prohib-
its consensual behavior, for the sake of dignity or any other rea-
son, it suppresses individual liberty and autonomy-partly
paternalistically, but mostly for the benefit of society at large.10 7
Therefore, the threat to society should be serious enough to
warrant use of criminal sanctions. For instance, the careless
attitude to human dignity exhibited by "Fear Factor," a popular
television reality show, has raised concerns of a number of its
viewers. One journalist commented: "Do we really need to see
people buried under 400 rats, each biting the exposed body
parts of the desperate contestants? No. And it doesn't get any
more palatable when someone yells out, 'Keep your butt cheeks
clenched!"'s
It is understandable that those pictures could disturb some
members of the public, but the nature and magnitude of the
personal and societal harm brought about by the show did not
rise to the level that would justify a criminal ban-that harm
was simply "not the law's business," 0 9 at least, not the criminal
law's business. Anthony Duff has accurately observed that not
punishing someone's conduct does not mean approving of it; in-
stead, that can mean the lack of standing to judge or condemn
105. See id. Dan-Cohen makes a similar point when he observes that the
term "dignity" should be understood as "moral worth" and not "social status." See
MEIR DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS: ESSAYS ON LAw, SELF, AND MORALITY 169
n.23 (2002).
106. Dubber, supra note 59, at 535.
107. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 87, at 172. "When B requests that
A do something for (or to) him that is directly harmful or dangerous to B's inter-
ests, or when the idea originates with A and he solicits and receives B's permission
to do that thing, then (in either case) B can be said to have 'consented' to A's action.
If nevertheless the criminal law prohibits A from acting in such cases, it invades
B's liberty (by preventing him from getting what he wanted from A) or his auton-
omy (by depriving his voluntary consent of its effect)." Id.
108. Tim Goodman, Reality TV Hits a Tailspin with NBC's "Fear Factor." SAN
FRANcIsco CHRONICLE, June 11, 2001, at E-1.
109. THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL
OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION 133 (Stein & Day 1963) (1957).
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such conduct. 110 We do not have to approve of radical cosmetic
surgery, religious flagellation, or sadomasochistic brutality;
however, society may be better served by not prosecuting those
consensual activities.
In other words, not every violation of human dignity de-
serves criminal punishment, but only such that affects society
at large. As I argued elsewhere, to avoid over-criminalization
yet capture the most egregious cases, the criminal doctrine
should be revised to explicitly include dignity violations in the
concept of wrongdoing."' Criminal harm then would retain its
current meaning as a wrongful setback to an important welfare
interest, but "wrongful" would mean either (i) such as violates
the victim's autonomy, or (ii) such as violates the victim's dig-
nity. 12 The two kinds of criminal harm comprise the same
evil-objectification of another human being. That evil may be
brought about by an injury to a vital human interest, combined
with either a rights violation (e.g., theft) or disregard of the vic-
tim's dignity (e.g., consensual deadly torture). The absolute ma-
jority of criminal offenses, being non-consensual, include both
kinds of harm.
As for consensual physical harm, it should be punishable
only when an important welfare interest normally protected by
criminal law is set back in a way that denies the victim his
equal moral worth. The recent German case in which Armin
Meiwes killed his willing victim, Bernd Juergen Brandes, and
then cannibalized on his flesh, may serve as an example." 3 By
killing Brandes, Meiwes did not violate Brandes's right to life.
However, he not only defeated the most essential interest of
Brandes (his interest in continued living) but also used Brandes
as an object, a means of obtaining the desired cannibalistic ex-
perience, and thus disregarded his dignity.
110. Duff, supra note 99, at 36.
111. Bergelson, supra note 69, at 219-221.
112. Interestingly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights makes this
distinction quite clear when it states in Article 1: "All human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12,
1948).
113. See Michael Cook, Moral Mayhem of Murder on the Menu, HERALD SUN
(Melbourne, Austl.), Jan. 15, 2004, at 17, available at http://www.australasianbio
ethics.org/Media/2004-01-16-MC-cannibal.html.
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In contrast, consensual mercy killing destroys the patient's
interest in continued living but, when warranted by the pa-
tient's condition and motivated by compassion, respects and
preserves his dignity. Such killing, therefore, should not be
subject to criminal sanctions. Unfortunately, the current law
does not recognize this difference. In Michigan v. Kevorkian, for
example, the state prosecuted Dr. Kevorkian for administering
a lethal injection to a former racecar driver who, due to ad-
vanced Lou Gehrig's disease, was no longer able to move, eat, or
breathe on his own." 4 Even the patient's family had accepted
his choice to escape the suffering and indignity of the slow de-
mise. 1 5 But not the trial court or the appellate court: Dr.
Kevorkian was convicted of second-degree murder, and his con-
viction was affirmed." 6
To summarize, in order to satisfy the second requirement of
the defense of consent, the perpetrator must establish that, to
the extent he set back the victim's welfare interests and, at the
same time, disregarded the victim's dignity, the harmful act
nevertheless produced an objectively positive outcome. In other
words, the more serious (disabling and irreversible) the harm to
the victim, the more significant the benefits of the injurious ac-
tion must be. A sadomasochistic beating, which leaves no per-
manent damage, should be justified by the mere fact that its
participants desired it. Even those who believe that such a
beating offends the victim's dignity would probably agree that it
does not significantly affect the victim's long-term interests. On
the other hand, only extraordinary circumstances might be able
to justify consensual deadly torture.
Finally, for complete justification, the perpetrator would
have to establish that he not only achieved a positive balance of
harms and evils but also intended it while causing harm. This
subjective requirement, common to all justification defenses, is
particularly appropriate in application to the defense of con-
sent. Just like in cases of necessity or self-defense, consent does
not impose on the perpetrator an obligation to act; it merely
provides him with an option. However, unlike necessity or a
114. People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291, 296-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
115. Id. at 330.
116. Id. at 296-97, 332.
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life-threatening attack, consent of the victim creates a very
weak content-independent reason for action.
When a child breaks a rule, we demand: "Why did you do
that?" This is a question about a moral reason for action and
effectively about the availability of a defense. What we want to
know is whether the child had a good reason for violating the
rule of conduct. We are unlikely to accept "because such-and-
such asked me to" as a valid reason or defense. The classic pa-
rental reply to that would be: "And what if he asked you to jump
off the Brooklyn Bridge?" By this reply, we in fact say: "You are
a free moral agent. Why, being a free moral agent, did you
choose to break the rule (cause harm)?" In the same sense, con-
sent of the victim may justify the defendant only if the defen-
dant had a morally sustainable reason for inflicting pain,
injury, or death.
The proposed conceptualization of the defense of consent
has two normative consequences. One is that consent alone
does not suffice to justify the victim's death or injury; the other
is that consent should always be at least a partial defense, be-
cause it defeats at least one aspect of harm, namely violation of
rights. A partial justification does not make a wrongful act
right; it only makes it less wrongful compared to an identical
but non-consensual act. Take a lifeboat scenario, in which all
will die, unless a few sacrifice their lives by jumping overboard.
Assume that the necessary numbers of people have volunteered,
but for whatever reason (perhaps they are too weak to be able to
move), they cannot complete the suicidal act on their own.
Would it be wrong to push them off? I believe that even if it
would be wrong, it would certainly be less wrong than drowning
those who have not volunteered. 117 It would be less wrong be-
cause the person who threw the victims over did not violate
their rights. Accordingly, he brought about less harm than in
an identical but non-consensual act and, thus, deserves a lesser
punishment.
The perpetrator should be entitled only to partial justifica-
tion if any of the following is true:
117. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 708 (1997) (making a similar
argument).
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(i) the harmful consensual act has brought about more bad
than good (e.g., the euthanized patient was not in pain and had
excellent prospects of recovery);
(ii) the harmful consensual act has significantly set back
the victim's interests and dignity (e.g., the Meiwes-Brandes case
of murder and cannibalism);
(iii) the perpetrator's conscious goal was to bring about evil
results (e.g., killing a consenting, terminally ill patient out of
sheer hatred for him and his family who will be financially ru-
ined when he dies); or
(iv) the perpetrator's conscious goal was to set back signifi-
cantly the victim's interests and dignity (e.g., with the intent of
injuring the victim's body and self-esteem, hiring the victim for
severe and humiliating beating).
The first example is typically a case of a mistake of judg-
ment. Like any other mistake, that case should be treated as an
instance of excuse and not justification. 118 If the perpetrator's
mistake was reasonable, he should be completely exonerated
from criminal punishment. For members of the medical profes-
sion, it may be advisable to add a rebuttable presumption that,
when in the course of consensual treatment they cause pain or
injury to their patients, they act appropriately and in the inter-
ests of those patients, i.e., to shift the burden of production with
respect to any alleged wrongdoing to the prosecution.
The second example involves the kind of harm, which, as
discussed above, should be prohibited by criminal law, irrespec-
tive of the parties' intentions and preferences.
The third and fourth examples involve situations in which
the perpetrator's reasons for causing consensual harm are ma-
levolent. Even if we assume that the perpetrator's purpose was
frustrated (e.g., in the third example, the terminally ill man
was spared the suffering of his final days, and his family found
a way out of financial trouble; and, in the fourth example, the
victim's injuries were not particularly severe), still the mali-
cious purpose, combined with the voluntary act, makes the per-
petrator guilty. In the third example, the perpetrator simply
118. See, e.g., Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for
Comparative Liability in Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385, 407-08 (2005)
(discussing why mistake should be a defense of excuse and not justification, and
citing conflicting views of the issue).
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lacks a good reason necessary for justification: hatred does not
justify intentional killing.
In the last example (still assuming the frustration of pur-
pose), the perpetrator's wrongdoing is somewhat similar to an
attempt. In the case of an attempt, the perpetrator commits a
wrongful act with a culpable state of mind, but does not bring
about the social harm proscribed by the completed offense. In
an attempted murder, for instance, the perpetrator shoots with
the purpose to kill, but misses his victim. His act is wrongful
because its objective is to violate the rights of the victim: people
have a right not to be physically attacked without provocation.
In my fourth example, the perpetrator also commits a wrongful
act with a culpable state of mind, namely, he beats the victim
with the purpose of causing injury to the victim's body and dig-
nity. This act does not violate the victim's rights because it is
consensual. It is nevertheless wrongful under the theory of
harm advocated here because its objective is to damage the vic-
tim's essential welfare interests and dignity. Due to the wrong-
fulness of his purpose, the perpetrator is not entitled to
complete justification. Unlike in the case of attempt, the perpe-
trator in the last example does cause the social harm proscribed
by the underlying offense, yet not all of the proscribed harm.
Thus, he is guilty of the completed, albeit mitigated, offense.
Naturally, the extent of partial justification attributed to
the victim's consent should depend on the facts of each case and,
at a minimum, reflect the importance of the victim's interests
(both harmed and intended to be harmed), the extent of the ac-
tual and intended damage to the victim's interests and dignity,
and the actual and intended balance of harms/evils and bene-
fits. In many instances, partial justification will reduce the per-
petrator's punishment to the minimal level. In the third
example above, the perpetrator's fault is not very significant.
He does not violate the victim's dignity, and while destroying
the victim's interest in continued living, he advances the vic-
tim's interest in avoiding pain and suffering. Due to his overall
evil purpose, the perpetrator does not deserve full justification,
but this does not mean he ought to go to jail. Community ser-
vice or its equivalent may be much more appropriate. Con-
versely, the perpetrator in the second example is guilty of a
serious wrongdoing, and his partial justification should not
710 [Vol. 28:683
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss4/3
CONSENT TO HARM
translate into the same mitigation of punishment as the partial
defense in the third example.
IV. Conclusion
Intentionally injuring or killing another person is presump-
tively wrong. To overcome this presumption, the perpetrator
must establish a defense of justification. Consent of the victim
may serve as one of the grounds for such a defense. For com-
plete justification, the perpetrator's reasons for a consensual in-
jurious act must be subjectively benevolent and the act must
produce an overall positive balance of harms and evils, includ-
ing harm to the victim's welfare interests and dignity. If these
requirements are not met, the defense should be only partial.
The proposed rule makes sense both theoretically and prac-
tically. From the theoretical perspective, it places consent
squarely within the family of justification defenses. All of them,
from self-defense to necessity, seek to overcome the deontologi-
cal constraint against intentional infliction of harm. These de-
fenses may be granted to a person who chose a certain course of
action despite its negative effects (as opposed to for the sake of
its negative effects) and succeeded in producing a better out-
come. From the practical perspective, this rule leaves room for
balancing the harms and benefits caused by the perpetrator.
This is an important difference from the current law, which is
absolute in what it allows and disallows. Overall, adopting a
rule based on a uniform principle common to other justification
defenses would lead to more fair, consistent, and morally sus-
tainable verdicts.
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